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EYES ON THE PRIZE
BY NANCY A. WELSH AND BOBBI McADOO

term mediation was confused
MERE
AGO. THE
reguiarlFIFTEEN
xwithYEARSmeditation.

Much has changed. The courts, frequently derided as overcrowded and
expensive for individual litigants and
the pubiic, now rely on mediation
to resolve cases and reduce dockets,
Attorneys and judges are advocates;
many have become mediators them-,
selves.
Disputants
generally express
satisfaction with the process. It is not
surprising that mediation-along with
other ADR processes-has achieved
institutionalization in the courts,
public agencies and the private and
nonprofit sectors.
We are now embarking on the
next stage: professionalization. There
are increasing references to "dispute
professionals" or "profi'ssional mediators." Presumably these terms signal
something more than simply being
paid for dispute resolution services or
achieving popular recognition of the
title "mediator."

It seems that dispute resolution
practitioners, especially mediators,
now seek the status and autonomy that
society grants to laxyers, accountants
and doctors. Mediators have attempted to adopt many of the characteristics
that distinguish professions from occupations. They have created national
organizations that offer vibrant confer-
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ences, hammered out ethical codes
and persuaded sponsoring courts and
agencies to establish training and experience requirements for admission
to mediator panels.
This progress, however, should
not obscure a central problem. Professions, as distinct from occupations, are

upon which the work of mediation
is based. Consequenty, it should
come as no surprise that there is no
consensus regarding the approach,
skills or ethics mediators should share.
The Model Standards for Mediators
certainly exist, but many practicing
mediators seem unaware of them or

In reality, the mediation field is simply not as professional
as many of us would like to believe that it is.
characterized by a distinct knowledge
system that sersves is a conceptual
map binding togeter the meribers
of the professi n and framing the
vay in which they think about, reason
through and act upon problems. This
shared sense of identity enables the
profession to determine appropriate
mechanisms for training, regulating
entvr and enforcing ethical and competent practice.
Among mediators, however, it
is difficult to discern any substantial
agreement regarding a systematic
body of esoteric, abstract knowledge

any other discrete set of norms that
should be used to guide and evaluate
their work. Perhaps mediation advocares' faith in the potential of this field
keeps us fron seeing the reality of
Insttutionalization-that many "professional" mediators' practices and
even their values are Influenced more
by the needs of the institutions within
which they work, or of the repeat p ay ers they often serve, than the independently-held values of a mediation
"profession." In reality the mediation
ficid is simplx not as professional as
man o us a.ould like to believe that it
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is. Professionalism will be within reach
only after mediators acknowledge current problems and limitations-and
work to correct them.
To be fair, we are unaware of
any extensive research regarding
mediators' compliance with the ethics espoused in the Model Standards.
Particularly in the court-connected
context, however, it is easy to find
quantitative and qualitative research
with worrisome implications. Add
alarming anecdotes and conversations
to the mix, and it seems time to take a
serious look at whether mediators can
claim to be members of a profession
that is faithful to certain key principles
and knowledge.

Faithfulness to self-determination
The Model Standards, even
in their proposed revised form, describe party self-determination as a
"fundamental principle of mediation
practice" which may only need to be
balanced with "a mediator's duty to
conduct a quality process" consistent
with mediators' ethics. Yet, there are
many examples of mediators behaving
inconsistently with party self-determination-both in terms of parties' control over the decision to mediate and
over the mediation process and outcome. Moreover, this behavior seems
not to be tied to any commitment to
quality process.
Paities' control over the decisionz to
mediate. Today, many court-connected
mediation programs rely on mandatory
referrals and make it difficult for parties to opt out. This system of coerced
education for lawyers and parties is
largely responsible for mediation's
widespread use, but it is also in tension with party self-determination, We
are aware that some mediators reconcile this tension by making it easy
for parties to opt out of the mediation
session. We are not aware of any mediators, however, who refuse to handle
mandatory referrals. In fact, we worry
that many more mediators view their
authority to require parties' continued
participation as an essential tool rather
than a threat to party self-determination.
Also, despite the strong likeli-
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hood that pro se parties are unaware of
their rights, less able to negotiate for
themselves when facing a represented
party and thus less able to exercise
meaningful self-determination, many
trial judges are nearly as likely to order them into mandatory mediation as
they are to order represented parties to
participate in the process. We are not
aware of any mediator who has refused
to mediate one of these cases, even
when the pro se party faces a represented part.
Parties' self-determination also
is not respected when judges force
participation in mandatory mediation
sessions and refuse to provide the
merits-based decision requested by
a party who has moved for summary
judgment. Recent research, however,
reveals that a worrisome percentage of
trial judges in the state of Minnesota,
for example, take just this approach.
One judge explained: "Don't bother
the court until you have exhausted

diation. Although the judge then gives
the parties the choice about whether to
have him proceed as their mediator, it
is difficult to see how that choice truly
respects party self-determination.
The coercion evident in these
examples is reminiscent of the power
imbalance that generally underlies
and infects mandatory arbitration
clauses in employment and consumer
contracts. Like the employees and
consumers who enter unknowingly
or reluctantly into these contracts, the
parties mediating under the circumstances described above are not freely
assenting to participate in mediation.
They are simply acquiescing under
the constraints of a severe power
imbalance. How then can the mediators-or "mediating" judges-claim to
be upholding the fundamental principle of all parties' self-determination?
If mediation is a profession with a
clear and shared set of norms, judges
would not even think about mediat-

As professionals, we should demand of ourselves
and our field that we add special value,
not merely serve as understudies who mimic
the primary actors in a system.
efforts" to settle the case. Another
commented: "It is a needless expenditure of limited court time to rule
on summary judgment when the case
may settle." A third judge wrote pithily: "Uncertainty breeds resolution."'
We are not aware of any mediator who
has refused a court's mediation referral under these circuistances, despite
the clear signal from at least one of the
parties that she wished to receive a
decision regarding the application of
the !aw.
Finally when one judge was asked
recently about the ethics of serving as
a mediator in a case, learning confidential information, and then trying that
case, he had a ready answer. He said
that before he mediates, he brings all
the parries together and, on the record,
reassures them that if they are unable
to settle, he will try the case as though
he did not earn -anything from the me-

ing a case and then presiding over its
subsequent trial. They would never
assume that the parties' assent to
mediation under these circumstances
is truly voluntary. In addition, at this
point in the evolution of the field,
professional mediators should be seen
refusing to accept mandator\ referrals
or, at the very least, making it easy for
the parties to opt out after they have
been educated regarding the potential
benefits of the mediation process. This
should be especially true for mediation sessions involving pro se parties.
Professional mediators who are asked
to mediate cases in which summary
judgment motions are pending should
refuse unless the parties freely agree
to proceed.
In addition, professional mediators should urge courts with successful
court-connected mediation programs
to abandon the crutch of mandatory
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referrals. Indeed, mediators could emulate those arbitrators who have such
strong concerns about mandatory arbitration clauses in the consumer context
that they now refuse to handle such
cases. These arbitrators are behaving
like professionals, whose faithfulness
to a set of ethical norms is stronger
tsin their acceptance b, or referrals
from, powerful institutions.
Pai-ies' contiro! over proarss and
outron. There are aiso numerous
examples of mediators behaving in a
manner inconsistent with parties' seltdetermination in their control over the
mediation process and its outcomes.
The case Ia i for example, now includes sad tales in which judges have
mediated cases and then ref.sed to
recuse themselves from proceedings
to decide the merits of objections to
the mediated settlements. In one such
case, the judge thought the case had

session and into caucus-if they even als, we should demand of oursehes
have a joint session-reducing the par- and our field that we add special value,
ties' direct ind active participation un not merely serve as understudies who
the determination of the issues to be mimic the primary actors in a system.
So, for example, professional medecided, the norms to be invoked and
the options that might exist for resoluJ- diators should:
tion.
" object oudly when judges mediEvaluation by mediators also ocate and taen preside over subsecus inmany mediation sessions. This
quent trials or motions to vacate
intervention is not inconsistent with
or enforce mediated settlement
Parties' self-deteriination per se.
agreements
Indeed, respectful and nonaggressiv e
evaluation can be consistent with party
* refuse to make recommendations
sel-detertination. \\e are concerned,
to judges in cases that do not
however, tha marn mediators do not
understand-o- care-that g -agnsice settle
or p 'ina lr ceaiaton is iot consis* know that evaluations are riot
tent with party self-determination.
appropriate until after both parIndeed, if attorneys expect mediators
ties-the clients, unless they
to aggressive\l reconcile clients to the
clearl choose to defer to their
reality of the Law it seeis that mediaattorneis-have had the opportutors are allowving lawyers to use them
nity to tell their stories and know
to circumvent the lawyers' obligation

that they have been sufficiently
heard by the mediator and each
other

Professionalsstand up for their ethics and serve as
the catalysts for institutionalreform.
to abide by their clients' ultimate anthority over the decision to settle.
Similarlyimediators may be alici
aunt to selcs to be used inappropriately if they agree to serve is cCourt
programs that focus on settlement as
the core criterion of success or that
require mediations to be con'pleteu
Jickly-in an hour or so. Nediators
working under these conditions are
likely to be tempted to propose specific settlement terms, and research
shows thaa such proposais can underminc parties' perceptions of mediaJon as a fir process. Further, partes'
agreemen t to settemens tetrasis more
thiese cases and provide recommienikely to be the res
of pressure than
dations, even th-ough Parties" control of a process devoted to party sef-dewithin the mediation rocess
c'nd
over termination.
In these exampies.
ediators are
the ultimate outcome are fikeiy to be
affected bs their knowledge ctat the either crea'ng conditions themselves
mediator may make disclosurs to -the that Tai to show respect far the fipresi ng judge.
damenta principe
'
of party self-deNMediators' behavior during me- ternis'nat'
or are agrecing to mediate
diation sessions also can undermine
under court-created circumstances
parties' sel-determination. Especially that make it unlikely that parti selfin the civil court context mediators determination wlj be at the coreof

settled; one of the parties disagreed.
In the subsequent chalienge, the
judge chose to enforce the supposed
settlerisent. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting the argument that
the judge's actions violated the appearance of fairness doctrine.-' Faithfuiness to party self-determination
Was not even considered.
In court-connected faiiil mcdiation, and now in some general civil
mediation progr'as, mediators are required to provide reconimendations to
judges for cases that do not settle. Apmiediators do not ike
parent ,any
-his requirement, but continue to take
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* never propose specific settlement
terms
* refuse to participate in mediation sessions that are too short to
permit the time for the parties to
be fully heard before they moxe
to the possibilities for resoution,
and
" encourag-e parties to think about
their agreement before signing a
binding setlement agreementor include a short-term cooling off
provision that o d allow rescission withoult penals
O' course, this is a lot to expect
o mediators alone, Courts also should
be o'gated to design programs that
protect par" self-determination. Professiona's, however, stand up for their
ethics and serve as the catalysts for
institutional reform.
Faithfulness to impartiality
There are also signs that mediatots ,re not behaving consisteny with

,he
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the dut-

Is

to

"disclose, as soon as practicable, all actual and potential conflicts of interest
that are reasonably known to the mediator and could reasonably be seen as
raising a question about the mediator's
impartiality."
We are aware of mediators who
have chosen not to disclose their previous work with a repeat player at the
table-an insurance company, school

4.1, which provides that a lawyer
"shall not knowingly ... make a
false statement of material fact or
law" or "fail to disclose a material
fact when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client." Thus,
lawyers owe no greater duty of
candor to court-connected, courtappointed mediators than they do

The core concepts of self-determination,
impartialityand justice representmediation's roots,
and hopefully, its future.
district, or major employer-even
when their interaction suggests familiarity. Xe suspect this is simply
because such previous work will raise
understandable concerns about the
mediator's impartiality, especially if
the repeat player is a regular source of
business.
If professional mediators truly
identify with the need for impartialit,. they will always disclose their prior
work with one of the parties and do it
in such a way that both parties-especially the one-time player-truly exercise self-determination in choosing
whether to continue or find another
mediator,
Faithfulness to justice
Mediators should be committed to
providing parties with both an experience of justice (procedural justice) and
fair outcomes (substantive justice).
We are concerned that mediators'
failure to convey their commitment
to justice, whether defined by the parties in the full and creative exercise
of their self-determination or determined by the parties' agreement to
follow the prescriptions of social-that
is, legal-norms, may help to explain
the following developments.
Comment 5 to Rule 2.4 of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct now makes it crystal clear
that lawyers are under no ethical
obligation to be candid with mediators. Rather, they are bound
only by the requirements of Rule
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to opposing counsel. Is this development consistent with the goal
of protecting the integrity of our
public courts and the justice to be
delivered by our litigation system?
Is it consistent with the notion
that mediators are professionals who have earned autonomy
and respect because they serve a
beneficial and important societal
purpose?
Though Rule 2.4 of the Model
Rules now requires a lawyer serving as a mediator to explain to an
unrepresented party that he or she
is serving as a third-party neutral
and to distinguish this role from
that of the lawyer representing
a client, the rule provides absolutely no guidance regarding the
unique characteristics or responsibilities of the mediator. Should
the lawver-mediator say: "I don't
represent you as a lawyer, but
you can be assured that I am here
to facilitate a fair process, one
that respects your full participation and self-determination and
ultimately produces what you
regard as a fair result, whether a
settlement is reached or not?" Or
should that mediator say: "I don't
represent you as a lawyer, and you
need to know that all I care about
is the settlement of this case, so
watch out for the tricks I might
play to manipulate you into saying
'yes' to me and the other side?"
Either statermnt seems to fulfill
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the lawyer-mediator's obligation
under Rule 2.4, and the second
disclosure just might be more
honest.
Looking ahead
Every stage in the evolution of the
field of mediation has had its promise
and its problems. Mediation has
achieved widespread institutionalization. Now, mediators have their eyes
on the prize of professionalization.
Like all meaningful prizes, though,
this one requires mediators to prove
themselves worthy.
The core concepts of self-determination, impartiality and justice represent mediation's roots-and hopefully, its future. We dare to hope that
these concepts-along with a better
theoretical and practical understanding of what exactly they mean and of
the conditions that enhance themwill one day bind us together as an
honored and valuable profession.
Committing to these values is
likely to mean, as the song "Eyes on
the Prize" proclaims:
So keep your eyes on the prize,
Don'tbe dismayed...
Deep in your heart,
You must believe:
Everything is gonna be aright,
Everythingis gonna be a/right,
Everything is gonna be a/right
someday.
And we say amen.

Endnotes
See, Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Look
Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalizationof Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEVADA L.J. - (2005).
DeMers v. Lee & Lee, 2000 WL264022
(Wash. App. Div. 1) (unpublished opinion).
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Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule
1.2(a).
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